



Kaplan v. County of Los Angeles,
_F.2d, 90 D.A.R. 801,
No. 87-6646 (9th Cir., Jan. 23, 1990).
Cost Recovery System for Statements by
Candidates in Voter Pamphlets Upheld
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has upheld the constitutionality of
California Election Code section 10012.
The section allows a local government
to defray the cost of publishing voter's
pamphlets by charging the candidates
listed in the voter's pamphlet who
choose to insert a limited recitation of
personal background and qualifications
a pro rata share of the printing costs of
the pamphlet.
The statute permits "[t]he local agen-
cy [to] estimate the total cost of print-
ing, handling, translating, and mailing
the candidate's statement to pay in
advance to the local agency his or her
estimated pro rata share as a condition
of having his or her statement included
in the voter's pamphlet." The statute
further provides that the amount paid by
the candidate will be adjusted if neces-
sary after the actual publication costs
are known. Under the statute, the local
agency neither profits from these pay-
ments nor uses them to finance the costs
of the election itself.
Leon S. Kaplan, then sitting as a
judge of the Los Angeles Municipal
Court, decided to run in a 1986 nonpar-
tisan election for an open seat on the
Los Angeles Superior Court. The
County Registrar estimated that Judge
Kaplan's pro rata printing costs amount-
ed to $52,000 for the June 3, 1986 pri-
mary election and subsequently estimat-
ed the cost to be $27,500 for the
November 4, 1986 general election.
Kaplan tendered only approximately
$24,000 for what he personally estimat-
ed was his share of the printing costs for
the June 3 primary election.
When the County Registrar rejected
this amount as inadequate and refused to
print Kaplan's statement, Judge Kaplan
then resubmitted his statement along
with a check for $52,000. However,
Kaplan subsequently withdrew his state-
ment from publication and received a
full refund; on the same day, he filed
this action in the district court seeking
an injunction against enforcement of the
County's requirement for advance pay-
ment of the publication costs and a
declaratory judgment that it violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. His
requests for declaratory and injunctive
relief were denied by the district court
and by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Judge Kaplan won in the pri-
mary election despite the absence of his
statement in the voter's pamphlet. For
the general election, he paid the advance
cost of $27,500 and had his statement
published. He then amended his com-
plaint to add a request for refund of the
$27,500.
Judgment was entered against
Kaplan in the district court, after which
Kaplan presented two issues on appeal:
(i) whether the cost recovery system
impermissibly infringes his First
Amendment rights; and (ii) whether the
system violates equal protection by dis-
tinguishing between candidates on the
basis of financial resources.
In its First Amendment analysis, the
court described the public forum doc-
trine and the "now familiar...three cate-
gories of access according to the type of
public property involved": the tradition-
al public forum, the "nonpublic" public
forum, and the limited or designated
public forum. Although the Ninth
Circuit agreed with Judge Kaplan's clas-
sification of the voter's pamphlet as
falling within the limited or designated
public forum, it disagreed with him as to
the appropriate level of scrutiny. Kaplan
invoked strict scrutiny, and argued that
the government must demonstrate that
section 10012 serves a compelling state
interest in a narrowly drawn fashion.
Finding that the restriction imposed by
section 10012 is content-neutral, the
court applied the lesser level of scrutiny
under Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983): the restriction must be shown to
serve a significant state interest in a nar-
rowly tailored fashion, and leave open
ample alternative channels of communi-
cation.
Under this lesser level of scrutiny,
the court upheld the validity of the sec-
tion. "The state's interest in publishing
voter's pamphlets in a way that does not
burden local agency budgets is a sub-
stantial interest. The statute is narrowly
drawn in that the local agencies can
recover actual costs alone, and cannot
profit from the publication charges nor
finance election costs with them. The
statute exempts the indigent from cost
liability and leaves open a variety of
alternative means for a candidate to
transmit his statement to voters."
Consistent with this analysis, the
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Ninth Circuit also rejected appellant's
equal protection argument. The
County's prepayment requirement is not
an absolute prerequisite to participation
in an election; failure to meet it does not
disqualify one from having his or her
name placed on the ballot. "The County
has provided one method for candidates
to express their qualifications to the
electorate, if they choose to do so and
share the cost. If not, they can utilize





Ass'n (CSEA), et al. v. State
of California, et al.,
F.Supp.-, 89 D.A.R. 12371,
No. C-84-7275-MHP (N.D. Cal.,
Oct. 3, 1989).
Gender Discrimination Claim Dismissed
Plaintiffs alleged "disparate treat-
ment" violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sections
2000e- 2000e-17, claiming that certain
female-dominated state job classifica-
tions were paid less than other similar
job classifications within the California
state government when evaluated on a
"comparable worth" theory. The U.S.
District Court for the Nothern District of
California held that the plaintiffs failed
to meet their burden of proving discrim-
inatory intent, as outlined in American
Fed'n of State, County and Mun.
Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (AFSCME), and
ordered the parties to submit additional
briefing on the status of the pending dis-
parate impact claims in light of the pre-
sent ruling and the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio, _U.S.-, 109 S.Ct.
2005 (1989).
The district court relied on AFSCME
in requiring plaintiffs to establish that,
before 1938, defendants intentionally set
lower salary levels for female-dominated
job classifications and that such discrimi-
nation was intentionally maintained after,
or carried over into, the 1938 state
restructuring of the state compensation
schedule. The district court summarily
rejected plaintiffs' showing of numerous
primary memos and other state docu-
ments as evidence of discriminatory
intent, largely on two bases.
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At times, the court found little proba-
tive value between incriminatory admis-
sions by given state officials and the
practical effect or impact of those admis-
sions on the state's decisionmaking poli-
cy regarding the setting of salaries and
wages. The court found that other evi-
dence proffered by the plaintiffs revealed
motivations other than sex discrimina-
tion, such as the state's desire to match
the prevailing rate dictated by the private
sector, which, under the preponderance
of the evidence, caused the plaintiffs to
fail in meeting their burden of proof.
However, the district court did not exam-
ine whether the state's policy in adhering
to wage-setting practices prevailing in
the marketplace reflected historical and
intentional sex discrimination.
The district court was also highly
critical of plaintiff's statistical evidence,
which purported to show that certain job
positions, when held by groups of
women, suffered in pay when compared
to the salaries of the men holding simi-
lar job titles. The court found the evi-
dence flawed primarily because the
empirical method of paralleling job
titles without first comparing or evaluat-
ing the substantive requirements of the
individuals employed to fill those titles
was itself suspect.
In short, the court found that in this
class action suit under Title VII, plain-
tiffs failed to bear the burden of show-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence
that sex discrimination was defendant's
standard operating procedure main-




Farron v. City and County
of San Francisco,
_Cal. App. 3d , 89 D.A.R. 15282,
No. A044579 (Dec. 20, 1989).
Public Meetings Not Required
for Mayor's Advisory Committee
The First District Court of Appeal
recently affirmed a superior court's judg-
ment which found that the mayor's San
Francisco Housing Demolition Task
Force, consisting of two members of the
city's Board of Supervisors, is not subject
to the Brown Act and therefore may oper-
ate in secret sessions closed to the public.
The Brown Act requires that all
meetings of a "legislative body" of a
local agency be open to the public.
Further, the Act defines "legislative
body" to include any "body on which
officers of a local agency serve in their
official capacity as members and which
is supported in whole or in part by funds
provided by such agency...."
Relying largely on a prior opinion of
the Attorney General, the court found
that the two city supervisors sitting on the
Task Force were not serving in their offi-
cial capacities because there was no evi-
dence to suggest that these individuals
were appointed to the Task Force to rep-
resent the board's interest. More impor-
tantly, according to the court, there was
no evidence that the board of supervisors
required its members to serve on the Task
Force or exercised any control over the
members' actions on the Task Force.
In light of this characterization of the
facts, the court found that the Task
Force is not subject to the open meeting
requirements of the Brown Act. Because
the matter was concluded dispositively
in this manner, the court did not find it
necessary to address the City's argument
that the mayor is exempt from the provi-
sions of the Brown Act.
Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v.
Board of Equalization,
_Cal. App. 3d-, 89 D.A.R. 15246,
No. C006406 (Dec. 14, 1989).
Tobacco Tax Initiative Does Not
Infringe State Legislature's
Appropriations Power
The Third District Court of Appeal
has ruled that Proposition 99 does not
violate Proposition 13, the single subject
rule applicable to initiatives, or the
equal protection clause of either the
United States or the California
Constitution; and does not infringe on
the legislature's constitutional appropri-
ations power.
On November 8, 1988, the California
voters approved Proposition 99, the
Tobacco Tax and Health Protection Act
of 1988 ("Act" or "Initiative"). Effective
January 1, 1989, the Act increased the
state tax on cigarettes and tobacco prod-
ucts and imposed additional taxes on
distributors of cigarettes and tobacco
products. The stated purpose of the ini-
tiative is to reduce smoking and other
tobacco use among children: to support
medical research into tobacco-related
cancer, heart, and lung diseases; to treat
people suffering from tobacco-related
diseases: and to support treatment of
patients suffering from tobacco-related
illness who cannot afford to pay for ser-
vices. The Act created the Cigarette and
Tobacco Products Surtax Fund in the
State Treasury into which all revenues
generated by its terms are to be deposit-
ed; all monies in the fund may be appro-
priated by the legislature only for speci-
fied purposes.
Plaintiff Kennedy, a distributor of
cigarettes and tobacco products, initially
alleged that Proposition 99 violates sec-
tion 3 of Article XIII A of the California
Constitution, commonly known as
"Proposition 13," which provides that
no statewide tax may be increased or
added except by a two-thirds vote of
both houses of the state legislature. In
rejecting this argument, the court stated
that, by its express terms, section 3 of
Article XIII A limits its scope to action
by the legislature. Therefore, Proposi-
tion 13, which imposes a supermajority
requirement on the legislature when
adjusting state taxes, does not repeal the
people's right to enact statewide tax
adjustments by statutory initiative pur-
suant to Article I1, sections 8 and 10,
and Article IV, section 1. The court held
that the imposition of supermajority
requirements by the people on the legis-
lature does not destroy the coextensive
nature of their powers to enact particu-
lar types of legislation.
Kennedy then asserted that
Proposition 99 violates the "single sub-
ject" rule (Article II, section 8(d) of the
California Constitution), which provides
that an initiative measure embracing
more than one subject may not be sub-
mitted to the electors or have any effect.
Kennedy claimed that this rule was vio-
lated because some of the legislature's
appropriations from the Initiative's sur-
tax funds are for environmental and
medical purposes which are neither
functionally related nor reasonably ger-
mane to each other or to the provisions
of the Initiative concerning tobacco
related problems. Kennedy further
asserted that the Act violates the single
subject rule because it contains more
than one item or appropriation.
The court rejected this argument.
stating that numerous provisions having
one general object, if fairly indicated in
the title, may be united in one act. In
support of its conclusion, the court
referred to similar holdings in chal-
lenges to Proposition 13, the Political
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Reform Act of 1974, the Victims' Bill of
Rights, and, most recently, Proposi-tion
103. Although each of these acts
involved multiple complex features, they
all satisfied the "single subject" rule
because their provisions were found to be
either functionally related to one another
or reasonably germane to one another or
the objects of the enactment. The court
stated that because Proposi-tion 99 has as
its broad goal the reduction of disease,
environmental damage, and economic
costs to the state which result from tobac-
co use, all of its provisions are reason-
ably germane to its purposes.
The court also rejected as "frivolous"
Kennedy's argument that the Act is
unconstitutional because it contains
more than one item of appropriation, as
prohibited by Article IV, section 12(d)
of the California Constitution. Article
IV deals solely with the legislative
department; thus, the provision is inap-
plicable to the appropriation of surtax
funds generated by statutory initiative.
Kennedy next argued that
Proposition 99 violates the equal protec-
tion clauses of the United States and
California Constitutions by imposing a
financial burden on tobacco distributors
and consumers for programs designed to
benefit the public at large. Kennedy
claimed that the question is not whether
tobacco distributors may be taxed but
whether they may be taxed when the
proceeds are linked to the funding of
particular programs.
In rejecting this argument, the court
stated that so long as a system of taxa-
tion is supported by a rational basis and
is not palpably arbitrary, it will be
upheld despite the absence of a precise,
scientific uniformity of taxation.
Further, the court found a rational rela-
tionship between the imposition of a tax
on cigarette distributors and the
Initiative's broad goals to fund educa-
tional, health, and environmental pro-
grams related to tobacco use.
Kennedy's final argument asserted
that the Act violates Article IV, section
12 of the state constitution by imposing
a legal limit on how the legislature may
appropriate the proceeds of the tax. The
court found that because the Act's
appropriation of surtax funds for speci-
fied purposes is a continuous appropria-
tion, it does not run afoul of Article IV,
section 12. Further, the rules imposed by
the Act are capable of change. The Act
provides an express grant of power to
the legislature to amend the provisions
of the Act by a four-fifths vote of the
membership of both houses. As a result,
the legislature is able to amend the Act
if it so desires.
Annamarie E. Ibrahim, et al. v.
Ford Motor Company,
-Cal. App. 3d-, 89 D.A.R. 12668,
No. A040454 (Oct. 13, 1989)
"Lemon Law" Allows Refund to Buyer
Without Manufacturer's Repair Effort
In May 1984, plaintiff Ibrahim
bought a new Mercury Cougar from the
Larry Albedi Motors dealership.
Plaintiff received a document entitled
"Ford Warranty Information," which
embodied Ford's express warranty that
the "selling Dealer will repair, replace,
or adjust parts, except tires, on 1984
Ford Motor Company Cars...found to be
defective in factory materials or work-
manship made or supplied by Ford"
which develop during the following
twelve months or 12,000 miles,
"whichever occurs earlier." During the
first five months of ownership, plaintiff
returned the vehicle to the Albedi deal-
ership for repairs no less than eight
times. During this time, the vehicle was
out of service for approximately 55
days. One of plaintiff's complaints
about her vehicle-the tendency of the
vehicle's engine to surge or die unex-
pectedly-was never resolved to her sat-
isfaction, despite the best efforts of the
dealer to correct the problem.
Following an unsuccessful attempt
by plaintiff to have Ford refund the pur-
chase price of the vehicle, she brought
suit against Ford, alleging breach of
express and implied warranties of fit-
ness and merchantability under the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act
(California's "Lemon Law", Civil Code
section 1790 et seq.), the Uniform
Commercial Code, and the Magnuson-
Moss Consumer Warranty Act. After the
trial court returned a verdict for Ford,
plaintiff appealed the judgment.
In reversing the trial court's decision,
the First District Court of Appeal noted
that Civil Code section 1793.2(d) estab-
lishes a substantive rule of general
application that a manufacturer is obli-
gated to replace or to reimburse the
buyer if "the manufacturer or its repre-
sentative in this state [are] unable to ser-
vice or repair the goods to conform to
the applicable express warranties after a
reasonable number of attempts."
Further, section 1793.2(e) establishes a
pair of standards establishing reason-
ableness within the particular area of
new motor vehicles-the vehicle is out
of service for more than 30 calendar
days, or the same problem has been the
subject of at least four attempts at repair
by "the manufacturer or its agents."
The appellate court found that con-
flicting jury instructions at the trial court
level served to create a misimpression as
to which party had the burden of proof
on certain issues. Specifically, the jury
was told that plaintiff had the burden of
proving that she "delivered the motor
vehicle to defendant, Ford Motor
Company, for repair," that "defendant
thereafter failed to repair the defect
after a reasonable number of attempts,"
and that "such failure was not caused by
conditions beyond the control of defen-
dant." Conversely, the jury was told that
Ford had the burden of establishing that
"Ford did not have a reasonable number
of repair attempts."
The appellate court held that these
instructions told the jury that the previ-
ous eight repair efforts of the Albedi
dealership were not to be considered for
the purpose of deciding plaintiff's enti-
tlement to reimbursement of the pur-
chase price from Ford, pursuant to sec-
tion 1793.2, subdivisions (d) and (e).
Further, the court held that the legisla-
tive history of these provisions demon-
strates beyond any question that such a
differentiation between manufacturer
and local representative is unwarranted.
Plaintiff's evidence sufficed to acti-
vate the presumption of subdivision (e),
which the legislature explicitly declared
to be "a rebuttable presumption affect-
ing the burden of proof." The effect of
such a presumption, according to
Evidence Code section 606, "is to
impose upon the party against whom it
operates the burden of proof as to the
nonexistence of the presumed fact." The
presumption established by subdivision
(e) operates against Ford, and Ford
therefore was obliged to carry the bur-
den of proof. The court held that error
occurred when the jury was instructed
otherwise.
According to the court, the crucial
issue before the jury was whether the
problem afflicting plaintiff's Cougar
persisted after a reasonable number of
attempts to correct it, triggering the
replacement or efund provision of the
Lemon Law. The key to resolving this
question was whether Ford passed or
failed the test of reasonableness.
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However, this issue was muddled by the
number of instructional errors provided
to the jury. The court found a reasonable
probability that the erroneous instruc-
tions were a factor in the jury's decision
to return the verdict in favor of Ford.
Because of the cumulative impact of the
errors, the appellate court reversed the
decision and granted Plaintiff relief.
CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY
GENERAL OPINION
No. 89-404 (Oct. 12, 1989).
Education Fund Is Not Required To Get
Certain Unredeemed Lotto Prizes
Following a request by the California
State Lottery Commission (CSL), the
Attorney General concluded that unre-
deemed "3 of 6" Lotto prizes of Cal-
ifornia residents are not required to be
transferred to the California State
Lottery Education Fund.
In the November 6, 1984, general
election, California voters adopted an
initiative measure which created the
California State Lottery Act of 1984
("the Act"; Government Code sections
8880 et seq.). The Act fixes limits on
the kinds of games which may be estab-
lished for the state lottery and regulates
the disposition of the proceeds of all
games. The Act also creates the CSL to
govern the operation of the state lottery
with the authority to promulgate rules
and regulations specifying the types of
games to be conducted.
One of the games authorized by CSL
is known as "California Lotto (6/49)."
CSL regulations provide that if a person
has a Lotto ticket which has "3 of 6"
winning numbers, the holder is entitled
to a prize of $5, redeemable from any
Lotto retailer. The retailer is credited
with the $5 prizes so paid out by a
deduction from the money paid for
Lotto tickets due the state lottery from
the retailer. Many holders of winning "3
of 6" tickets fail to collect their prizes
within the statutory 180-day period for
redemption; the CSL estimates the
amount of unredeemed "3 of 6" $5
prizes to be approximately $5 million
per year.
Section 8880.4 of the Government
Code provides for the allocation of lot-
tery revenues. This section also states
that "all unclaimed prize money shall
revert to the benefit of public education
as provided for in section 8880.32(e)."
Section 8880.32(e) provides that "[i]f a
valid claim is not made for a prize
directly payable by the Lottery
Commission within the period applica-
ble for that prize, the unclaimed prize
money shall revert to the benefit of the
public purpose described in this chap-
ter." Further, CSL regulation 7.b states
that "a prize of $5 or less must be
claimed only from an authorized CSL
retailer, unless the claimant resides out-
side California." The Attorney General
determined that CSL had sufficient
statutory authority to promulgate such a
rule, as Government Code section
8880.32(a) permits CSL to authorize lot-
tery game retailers to pay winners of up
to $600 after performing validation pro-
cedures appropriate to the lottery game
involved.
Based on the preceding, the Attorney
General found that the "3 of 6" $5 Lotto
prizes of California residents are not
"directly payable" by CSL within the
meaning of section 8880.32(e).
Accordingly, the requirement of that
section that unclaimed prize money
shall revert to public education does not
apply to such prizes.
However, the Attorney General noted
that SB 906 (Chapter 917, Statute of
1989) will amend section 8880.32(e) to
provide that "[i]f a valid claim is not
made for a prize directly payable by the
Lottery Commission or for any Lotto
prize within the period applicable for
that prize the unclaimed prize money
shall revert to the benefit of the public
purpose described in this chapter." This
statute went into effect January 1, 1990.
The Attorney General concluded by
noting that until Chapter 917 became
effective, CSL could lawfully transfer
funds allocated for the payment of "3 of
6" Lotto prizes which are unredeemed to
pay other prizes or lottery expenses or to
the California State Lottery Education
Fund provided all other provisions of
the Act were satisfied.
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